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Abstract 
This paper estimates heterogeneous hedonic prices for different levels of housing space, by 
exploiting a unique space-adding project in Singapore that added a uniform amount of 6m2 of 
space to each existing housing unit regardless of the original size of the unit. This space adding 
was part of a large scale urban renewal and housing upgrading policy in Singapore, and was 
carried out only if sufficient residents within a high-rise building vote in favour of space adding. 
Using a difference-in-differences strategy after restricting our sample to narrow margins 
around the voting cut-off, we find that the additional space increased the resale price of a 
housing unit by 7% on average, and the extent of price appreciation varied significantly across 
the original size of the units.  
This unique social experiment provides the opportunity to compare the differencing-produced 
implicit price of housing space to that obtained directly from a standard hedonic regression. 
We find that the differencing methods based on repeated transactions produce slightly lower 
average implicit price of housing space as those from the hedonic approach, but with a larger 
variation across the original size of the unit.  
JEL Classification: D04, R21, R28 
Keywords: housing space, implicit price, hedonic regression, urban redevelopment 
 
1. Introduction 
 Households choose where to live and which unit to buy by considering a bundle of 
housing characteristics, and housing space is one of the most important contributors to the total 
willingness to pay for the unit. From the demand perspective, adequate housing space is a 
critical screening factor used in narrowing a property search. Space constraint is also a key 
determinant when consumers decide to upgrade their residence. From the supply perspective, 
the size of a housing unit is a key parameter that developers adjust to maximize profits.1 
Housing space also plays a pivotal role in designing urban development policies.2 Given its 
importance to policy makers as well as to consumers and producers’ bid and offer functions 
that underlie the hedonic price equation, it is essential to have a good understanding of the 
hedonic price of housing space. However, estimates obtained from a standard hedonic 
regression could suffer from potential functional form misspecifications and endogeneity 
arising from omitted variables.3  
This paper addresses these problems by conducting a model-free estimation of the 
hedonic price of housing space, using a unique quasi-experiment in Singapore that adds a 
uniform amount of space to existing housing units regardless of their original size. The 
Singapore space-adding quasi-experiment is part of an extensive housing upgrading program 
driven by the need to rejuvenate neighbourhoods concentrated with relatively older and smaller 
                                                          
1 This is especially so when stringent zoning regulations have been imposed to restrict the floor area ratio. In the 
standard non-stationary, durable housing models, housing is also often assumed to be externally immutable but 
internally malleable (see, for example, Anas, 1978; Arnott, 1980; Fujita, 1976).  
2 For example, Shanghai Municipality in China considered that rapidly increasing floor consumption to be the 
city’s first priority when recovering from the Cultural Revolution. With this aim, floor area per person has 
increased from 3.6 square meters in 1984 to 34 square meters in 2010 (Bertaud, 2011). In addition, according to 
Deaton (2010), how to deal with the hedonic price for space matters in accounting for housing expenditures in 
national accounts. This in turn determines the poverty line, artificially moving millions of people in and out of 
poverty 
3 Since Rosen (1974)’s seminal work on the theory of hedonic prices, empirical applications of his proposed 
two-step method to recover demand and supply parameters from the hedonic price equation have grown 
extensively, especially in the housing market. Despite the model’s general theoretical soundness, estimations of 
the hedonic regression have been challenged by potential functional form misspecifications and endogeneity 
arising from omitted variables (see e.g. Cropper, Deck, & McConnell, 1988; Halvorsen & Pollakowski, 1981; 
Harrison & Rubinfeld, 1978; Kuminoff, Parmeter, & Pope, 2010 for discussions on hedonic functional form 
misspecifications and omitted variable bias; Linneman, 1978). 
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estates. One aspect of this upgrading program involves adding an additional 6m2 of space to 
existing apartments (henceforth referred to as flats) in high-rise buildings (henceforth referred 
to as blocks), regardless of the original size of the flat.  Before the implementation of the space-
adding project, residents at each block were polled regarding their preferences for it. The 
project proceeded for a block if at least seventy-five percent of the block’s residents voted in 
favour of it. This feature of the program lends itself to a natural experiment that allows us to 
identify the impact of adding space to existing housing units by exploiting the discontinuity at 
the voting threshold. 
 We quantify the impact of adding space to existing units using individual flat 
transactions matched with block-level polling results for the space-adding project. Using a 
difference-in-differences strategy, we identify the effect of space-adding by comparing the 
price before and after the upgrading for blocks with space added (the treatment group) versus 
blocks without (the control group).  The main identification challenge is that blocks which 
voted in favour of the space adding may be unobservably different from blocks that voted 
against the space adding in ways that are associated with potential future price appreciation. 
We resolve this issue by comparing blocks with voting results just above the threshold and 
those just below the threshold. The uniform increase in space, regardless of the original size of 
the flats, allows us to examine the heterogenous impact of space-adding to flats of differing 
floor area in a model-free setting, and thereby trace out the shape of the hedonic price function 
of housing space.4    
 We first document the impact of space-adding on the total value of the units. The space-
adding project resulted in an average 7% rise in the value of the flat and the extent of price 
appreciation varied significantly across the original size of the units. While large units 
                                                          
4 We argue that the treatment differences between the treated and the untreated are driven mainly by the added 
space. As will be detailed later, our sample includes only blocks that have proceeded with the standard package 
of the upgrading program, which involves a general renovation of the block. The space-adding item is an 
additional package that is offered on top of the standard package. 
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maintained roughly the same price levels as before, small units experienced substantial price 
appreciation.  For example, units with original housing space less than 55 square meters 
experienced a 16% rise (or a nominal price increase of S$27,5005), while units with original 
size between 55 and 65 square meters experienced only a 9% increase (or a nominal price 
increase of S$15,5006). The evidence is consistent with a concave-shaped hedonic function 
tracing the extent to which house price varied with housing space.  The declining increase in 
hedonic price in response to the same uniform change in space, as the original size of the flat 
increases, is also consistent with theoretical assumptions of diminishing returns in both 
production and consumption. 
Next, we explore whether total house price appreciation is attributable to the increase in 
space alone, or if it is due to the combined effect of a change in housing space and the average 
price per unit of housing space. If the marginal price of housing space falls as space increases, 
we could observe an initial increase in the average price per unit of housing space initially, 
followed by a plateau, then a decrease when marginal price falls below the average price curve. 
To study this, we estimate the causal impact of adding 6 square meters of space on the 
underlying valuation of housing space on a per-square-meter basis. We find that adding 6 
square meters of space to units originally smaller than 55 square meters increased per-square-
meter price by 10.5%. Together with the added space, this led to an overall price appreciation 
of 16% documented earlier. For units with housing space between 55 square meters and 75 
square meters, per-square-meter price did not change significantly and the total house price 
appreciation is mainly attributed to the enlarged housing space. For units larger than 75 square 
meters, per unit price fell by 8-9% following the space adding, but the total value of the units 
remained roughly the same due to the increase in housing space. 
                                                          
5 S$27,500 is based on 16% of the mean nominal price of treated flats in our benchmark period. 
6 S$15,500 is based on 9% of the mean nominal price of treated flats in our benchmark period. 
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These findings contribute to our understanding of the role of housing space in 
determining the value of a housing unit. Despite its importance, we have only encountered the 
following three papers that look specifically at the value of housing space. Follain, Lim, and 
Renaud (1982) use three different methods (direct estimation of demand for space; bid-rent 
approach; hedonic equation) to estimate the willingness to pay for additional housing space. 
This is then compared with the cost of additional space to inform public housing policies in 
Korea. To inform public housing policies in Hong Kong, Hui (1999) also estimates the 
willingness to pay for additional space using the contingent valuation method via a survey. Gao 
and Asami (2011), concerned about the distortion in China’s urban housing market, use the 
hedonic approach to figure out people’s preferred housing size in urban China. This paper adds 
to this thin literature by tracing out the shape of the hedonic price function of housing space 
flexibly, while addressing the problems of functional form misspecifications and omitted 
variable bias. We also show that the increase in housing value can be driven by a combination 
of a rise in the average price per unit of housing space and the increase in space itself.  
The paper is also related to the literature on hedonic studies, especially those focusing on 
estimating the impact of temporal variables (Clapp and Giaccotto, 1998; Sirmans et al. 2006). 
Coulson and McMillen (2008), for example, has focused on isolating the impact of time-
varying age on property values by adopting the repeated sales model to difference out 
characteristics that is time-invariant. Similarly in our unique setting of the space-adding project, 
the size of the housing unit varies before and after the project implementation, which provides 
a valuable opportunity to identify the impact of housing size in a repeated sales setting. Similar 
to the literature, we also contrast our findings to those obtained from the standard hedonic 
regressions in the Results section.  
Comparing the implicit price of housing space estimated from a differencing approach to 
that obtained directly from a hedonic regression helps access the effectiveness of these two 
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different approaches in calculating the housing price index. Hedonic method is widely used to 
produce housing price index, but is often criticized for omitted variable bias and arbitrarily 
imposed functional form. To address these issues, repeated sales method was proposed in 
Bailey, et al (1963) and Case and Shiller (1989) and further assessed in Hwang and Quigley 
(2004) and Harding et al., (2007). The idea is to difference out a flexible function of unobserved 
housing attributes and implicit prices based on a set of repeatedly transacted units. There is, 
however, no evidence to show that the implicit prices of hedonic attributes differenced out in 
a repeated sales setting match those estimated from hedonic regressions. This paper utilizes 
this unique social experiment to identify the implicit price of housing space from a differencing 
approach and compares that to those obtained from standard hedonic regressions. The evidence 
suggests that the implicit prices of housing space produced by these two approaches largely 
match each other, though the differencing approach based on repeated transactions produces 
larger variation in the magnitude of the implicit price across the original space. 
This paper also contributes to the literature that combines quasi-experiments with the 
hedonic model to address the concern of omitted variables (e.g. Black, 1999; Chay & 
Greenstone, 2005; Figlio & Lucas, 2004; Gayer, Hamilton, & Viscusi, 2000; Linden & Rockoff, 
2008; Jaren C Pope, 2008; Jaren C. Pope, 2008). The space-adding project that proceeded only 
if sufficient residents voted for it allows us to exploit the discontinuity at the voting threshold 
to account for omitted variables. The unique policy feature that increased space uniformly 
regardless of the original size of the housing unit also allows us to relax functional form 
restrictions on the hedonic price function and to trace out the hedonic price function of space 
flexibly (see Anglin & Gencay, 1996; Parmeter, Henderson, & Kumbhakar, 2007 for examples 
of attempts to relax functional form restrictions)  We compare our DiD estimates to estimates 
from the traditional hedonic approach, and find that the traditional hedonic approach slightly 
overestimates the average price appreciation following the upgrading. In addition, the shape of 
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the curve obtained if we plot average price per square meter against housing space seems to 
differ across the traditional hedonic and quasi-experiment methods. This could be driven by 
omitted variable bias or misspecification of the functional form. 
Finally, the evidence documented in this paper is also related to the literature on housing 
upgrading and remodelling. Classical models of urban growth incorporating redevelopment of 
durable housing suggest that developers respond to the time path of land values and redevelop 
a parcel if the price of land for new development exceeds the price of land in its current use by 
the cost of demolition.7 The demolition cost, even though often assumed away in a simplified 
theoretical setting, could potentially be substantial due to prolonged household and 
neighbourhood disruptions.8 Alternatively, urban renewal might be achieved by upgrading 
existing properties, which could be a less costly and disruptive approach. This paper provides 
evidence on the potential benefits of upgrading by examining the extent to which adding space 
to existing units increases the underlying valuation of existing housing space. The significant 
price appreciation following the remodelling of small units helps to justify the upgrading 
program.   
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarises the relevant institutional 
background of this upgrading program. Section 3 describes our data and construction of key 
variables. Sections 4 and 5 explain our identification strategy and empirical specifications. The 
main results can be found in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Institutional Background 
                                                          
7 See Brueckner (1980), Wheaton (1982), and Braid (2001) for models incorporating residential redevelopment 
into the theory of urban growth with durable housing. See Rosenthal and Helsley (1994) for empirical evidence 
that supports the validity of the redevelopment condition. 
8 These disruptions include displacement of incumbent residents (who are usually of lower socio-economic 
status) and the concomitant loss of social networks (Atkinson, 2000; Collins & Shester, 2013; Keating, 2000; 
Zuk et al., 2015). Even when displacement doesn’t occur, gentrification may lead to welfare losses for 
incumbent residents e.g. in terms of rent increases (Bartik, 1986) and changes in industrial and retail mix which 
lead to a loss of higher-paying employment for the less-educated (Lester & Hartley, 2014) 
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The space-adding quasi-experiment is part of an extensive public housing upgrading 
program in Singapore, driven by the need to rejuvenate neighbourhoods concentrated with 
relatively older and smaller estates. In this section, we will describe briefly Singapore’s unique 
public housing landscape and elaborate on the upgrading program which the space-adding 
project is a part of.  
2.1. Public Housing in Singapore 
Public housing in Singapore9 (locally known as Housing and Development Board (HDB) 
flats because they are built by HDB) is provided in the form of 99-year lease-based high-rise 
flats, and is recognized to be of good quality. The scale of public housing in Singapore is 
unique. More than 80% of Singapore’s resident population live in HDB flats; and about 90% 
of these households own their flat (HDB, 2016). HDB flats can be purchased directly from the 
government, with significant government subsidies10, or from the resale market, where flat 
owners sell directly to buyers after completing the minimum occupancy period.11 In this paper, 
we focus on the resale price of HDB flats as they are market-driven.  
HDB flats in Singapore are organised into 26 towns or estates.  Each HDB town or estate 
is divided into neighbourhoods, which are further divided into precincts of 5 – 10 high-rise 
blocks of HDB flats. Blocks within a precinct are located in close geographical proximity to 
one another. In addition, they are usually homogenous in terms of quality and design. This is 
because new flats are typically designed by HDB architects at the precinct level, and pre-
fabrication construction techniques (which require a large degree of standardisation) are used. 
                                                          
9 Residential properties in Singapore are grouped into three categories: private non-landed properties (including 
private apartments and condominiums), private landed properties, and public housing. 
10 Direct purchases from the government are subject to eligibility criteria, and locations of flats are usually more 
restrictive.  
11 Owners of HDB flats are not allowed to sell their flats until they have stayed in their flats for a minimum 
period. This minimum occupancy period is currently 5 years. It was raised from 3 years in 2010.   
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Within each block, it is also possible to have a mix of different flat-types, e.g. 3-room flats, 4-
room flats.  
2.2. Upgrading Programs  
The quality of HDB flats has varied over the years. Flats built in the early 1960s had 
minimal features, as the government’s priority then was to build sufficient flats to house 
Singapore’s population. Once basic housing needs had been met, HDB started improving the 
flat quality by building larger and better-designed flats in the 1970s. The improvement in the 
quality of new flats has continued since then. The continued improvement in flat quality opened 
a gap in the quality of new and old flats, which led to dissatisfaction with the older flats as well 
as an exodus from the older to newer estates.  
To improve the quality of aged HDB estates, the government has undertaken a series of 
large-scale upgrading programs.12 The first of these systematic upgrading schemes was a large-
scale upgrading program named the Main Upgrading Programme (MUP), which the space-
adding item is a part of. 13 The MUP proceeded in batches (i.e. the MUP was offered to different 
precincts at different times) and ran from 1990 to 2012, benefiting about 130 precincts spread 
across Singapore (Chin, 2012). The main criteria for choosing precincts for the MUP for each 
batch were: (i) age of blocks; (ii) a relatively even spread across HDB towns; and (iii) precincts 
had blocks with a majority of 3-room flats – relatively smaller flats (Low, 1996). Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 suggest that the government adhered to these criteria: upgraded flats are in planning 
areas14 with older and smaller flats, and these flats are distributed relatively evenly across 
different geographical regions.  
                                                          
12 See e.g. Phang (2015) and Teo and Kong (1997) for more details on HDB’s upgrading programs.  
13 Part of our information on the MUP came from HDB’s website. The relevant pages, however, have since been 
taken down due to the completion of the MUP. PDF versions of the relevant webpages are available on request.  
14 Planning areas are used by Singapore government agencies for urban planning and administrative purposes. 
Their boundaries differ somewhat from HDB town boundaries, but we use planning areas in this map as geocoded 
boundaries for HDB towns were not readily available.  
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The space-adding item (SAI) is an additional package on top of the standard package15 
of the MUP.  SAI added about 6m2 of floor area to existing flats, and the space was added by 
building additional columns next to existing blocks, then knocking down the connecting wall 
between the columns and existing flats when the columns were completed. If SAI were to 
proceed for a block, all flats within the block would receive the additional space, regardless of 
the original size of the flat and flat-type. 
Once HDB offered MUP to a precinct, residents within a precinct would vote for or 
against the standard package and SAI separately, but the two polls would take place at around 
the same time. This voting process is important as part of the upgrading costs would be borne 
by the residents. The standard package would proceed for a precinct if at least 75% of the 
precinct’s eligible citizen households voted in favour of it. The SAI would proceed for a block 
if the precinct it belongs to voted successfully for the standard package to proceed and at least 
75% of the block’s eligible citizen households voted for the SAI. In our study, we limit our 
sample to include only blocks for which the standard package was implemented, creating 
greater homogeneity within our sample.  Since the MUP was offered to different precincts at 
different time periods, the time of polling and implementation varied across precincts. We are 
thus able to exploit cross-sectional and temporal variation in our identification strategy. 
To ensure that households are not over-burdened by the upgrading costs, the government 
subsidized the costs for Singaporean citizens heavily, with owners of smaller flats (who 
typically have lower incomes) receiving a larger subsidy. Instalment plans for payment were 
also made available, and flat owners may also use their own savings for the payment. Here we 
highlight an important feature of bill payment which influences our empirical specification: 
                                                          
15 The standard package of the MUP consists of upgrades to communal facilities at the precinct and block level, 
as well as improvements within individual flats. Examples of these upgrades include: multi-storey car parks, 
covered walkways, addition of ramps to improve wheelchair access, or playgrounds at the precinct level; 




Flat owners who sold their flat before they received the bill would not have to pay the upgrading 
cost; rather, buyers of the flat would have to foot the bill. For such sales transactions, we can 
expect buyers to negotiate a lower transaction price in view of the upgrading bill tab they would 
have to pick up later.  
Despite subsidies from the government, 133 out of 243 blocks in our sample voted 
against SAI. This was due to at least three reasons. First, SAI would result in inconvenience, 
as the construction required for SAI would be carried out right next to existing flats. Potential 
negative externalities generated by SAI construction may deter the need for upgrading, 
especially for elderly flat owners. Second, flat owners have to pay quite a substantial amount 
if they opted for SAI. E.g., 1-3 room flat owners have to pay S$8,640 (after subsidy) if they 
opted for SAI16. In this instance, financially constrained owners would be more likely to vote 
against SAI. Third, some flat owners who voted against SAI could have a lower intrinsic 
demand for space. This variation in whether blocks voted in favour of SAI or not will be used 
to define our control and treatment groups.  
 
3. Data 
3.1. Data sources and variables 
We obtain data for this study from three different sources. First, we download official 
statements of polling results for each block that was polled for the space-adding item (SAI) 
between Apr 2000 and Jul 2008 from the Singapore Government e-Gazette, an online 
repository of subsidiary legislation and gazettes. We use these statements to construct a novel 
dataset, containing SAI polling results at the block level and the polling date. We use the 
decision rules outlined in Section 2, as well as these polling results to construct dummy 
                                                          
16 Cost figures are nominal and are relevant for precincts announced for MUP under Batch 20 onwards. The 
webpage from which we retrieved this information is no longer accessible online. PDF version of the webpage 
is available on request.   
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variables indicating if SAI was carried out. Second, we obtain the MUP/SAI billing date from 
HDB’s online enquiry service. Third, we download administrative data on all HDB resale 
transactions for the period Jan 2000 – Aug 2015, from the Singapore government’s data sharing 
website, https://data.gov.sg/. This provides us with data on the block, flat-type, floor/storey 
range, age, resale price and transaction month for each flat sold in this period. Resale price will 
be used as our main outcome variable.  
We merge these three datasets, keep only precincts that voted for the standard package 
of MUP to proceed, and drop all precincts that were not polled for SAI between 2000 and 2008. 
We drop two precincts – Mei Ling and Kallang Basin – as these precincts do not have sufficient 
transactions in the period before the poll17. The combined dataset for our study thus includes 
only transactions in precincts which were polled for SAI between Jul 2000 and Jul 2008. In all, 
our dataset contains 18,817 transactions taking place across 48 precincts / 243 blocks.  
3.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 1a presents the overall summary statistics for our combined dataset. The majority 
of flats in our sample are old, with leases starting between 1967 and 1985, and relatively small, 
reflecting the government’s stated policy of upgrading older and smaller flats. There is 
considerable variation in SAI polling results: the mean percentage of eligible citizen 
households in each block voting in favour of SAI is 69.67%, with a standard deviation of 
15.42%. Table 1b breaks down the mean summary statistics by HDB town. The first two 
columns show that blocks polled for SAI in our sample are spread rather evenly across the 
island (see Figure A1 for a map of HDB town locations). In addition, the mean flat type and 
lease commencement year of transacted flats does not vary dramatically across HDB towns.  
                                                          
17 We need a sufficiently long period before the poll as we will include a placebo lead policy variable in our 
empirical specification to test statistically for whether our data violates the validity of the underlying assumption 




4. Identification Strategy 
We analyze the effect of space-adding item (SAI) on resale prices and resale prices per 
square meter using a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy. The treatment group comprises 
resale transactions in blocks which have voted in favour of SAI (i.e. at least 75% of the block’s 
eligible citizen households voted for the SAI), while the control group corresponds to resale 
transactions in blocks which have voted against SAI.  
The DID design is valid only if the trends of resale prices of the treatment and control 
groups are the same in the absence of treatment. This assumption is often checked by 
comparing trends from both groups during the pre-treatment period. We plot in Figure 3a the 
unconditional monthly mean of log resale price from 60 months before the SAI polling month 
to 150 months after the SAI polling month, based on all blocks in our sample. It is obvious that 
the pre-treatment log resale price trends of the treatment and control groups are different. This 
brings up concerns as blocks where a low percentage of households voted for SAI are likely to 
be quite different from those where a high percentage voted for SAI.18 
As the differences between the SAI blocks and non-SAI blocks are likely explained by 
observed location and household characteristics, we obtain the residual of log resale price after 
controlling for block fixed effects.  If the pre-trend becomes similar after controlling for block 
fixed effects, we are more confident that the SAI and non-SAI blocks serve as comparable 
treatment and control groups. Results are plotted in Figure 3b, where there still exists a fair 
amount of deviation in price trend leading to the treatment.  This suggests that the control and 
treatment groups are sufficiently different to invalidate the identifying assumption of the DiD 
                                                          
18 The non-SAI blocks tend to have higher house price appreciations prior to the polling date for SAI. It could be 
that households who vote against further upgrading are also those that favor the existing structure of their units 
because of prior investments in maintenance and renovation.  
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strategy. For this reason, we further restrict our sample to a 10-percentage-point margin on 
either side of the 75% threshold and plot out similar residuals after controlling for block fixed 
effects in Figure 3c.  In this case, the difference in pre-treatment trends between the treatment 
and control group largely disappears.19  More importantly, it becomes apparent that blocks 
which voted for SAI experience a higher rate of price appreciation after the polling has been 
conducted. 
 
5. Empirical Specifications 
We further verify the validity of the DID design as part of the regression specification. 
To this end, we specify four periods: the benchmark period is from Jan 2000 to five months 
prior to the month in which households were polled for the space-adding item (SAI); the 
placebo-lead period is an interval of four months before the polling month – this will be used 
in our empirical specification to provide further evidence that our DID design is valid; the poll-
bill period stretches from the polling month to the month before households were billed for 
SAI; and the post-bill period is from the billing month to Aug 2015. We restrict the placebo-
lead period to an interval of four months to maximize the number of precincts we can keep in 
our sample.20 
We estimate the effect of SAI on resale prices and resale prices per square meter using 
the following specification: 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃 ) = 𝛽 𝑆𝐴𝐼 × 𝐼 ,  + 𝛽 𝑆𝐴𝐼
× 𝐼 ,   
+ 𝛽 𝑆𝐴𝐼 × 𝐼 , + 𝑋 + 𝜇 + 𝜏  + εibt  
(1) 
 
                                                          
19 We do not plot the price trend using more restricted sample in the 70%-80% range because its small sample 
size prevents us from tracking price changes continuously. 
20 The polling month in some precincts occurs close to the start of our sample. 
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where 𝑃  is the nominal resale price or resale price per square meter for transaction of flat i 
in block b and month-year t; 𝑆𝐴𝐼  is a dummy for whether the block voted in favour of SAI; 
𝐼 ,  , 𝐼 ,  , and 𝐼 ,  are dummies for whether the transaction 
occurred in the placebo-lead, between polling and billing and post-billing periods respectively; 
𝑋  captures transaction-level information on flat type and floor level range; 𝜇  and 𝜏  are 
block fixed effects and year-month fixed effects. The standard errors in all regression analyses 
are clustered at the precinct level.  
The key parameters of interest are 𝛽 , 𝛽𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑙−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙, and 𝛽 . 𝛽  
estimates the average percentage difference in the resale prices between the treatment and the 
control group relative to the benchmark period. If our DID specification is valid, we would 
expect 𝛽  , which serves as a pseudo treatment effect, to be insignificantly different 
from zero. 𝛽  and 𝛽  measure the average percentage difference in resale prices 
between the treatment and the control group (relative to the benchmark period) during the 
period between polling and billing, and the period after billing respectively. We distinguish 
between 𝛽  and 𝛽  for two reasons. First, the construction period falls between 
polling and billing dates, during which prices may reflect construction externalities.  Second, 
flat owners who sold their flat before they received the bill do not have to pay the upgrading 
cost; rather, buyers of the flat would have to foot the bill. Flat owners, however, had to pick up 
the upgrading tab if they sold their flats after they were billed.  As such, we expect  𝛽  
to be larger than 𝛽 . While we expect 𝛽  to be positive, 𝛽  could be close 
to zero or even negative due to buyers’ need to subsequently pay for the upgrading cost and 
endure any inconveniences caused by the ongoing construction for upgrading. 21 
                                                          
21 We do not include a period for post-construction as we do not have precise information on when upgrading for 
each precinct was completed. 
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Our ability to interpret 𝛽  and 𝛽  as treatment effects could be hindered by 
unobserved heterogeneity between treatment and control groups. These parameters could be 
biased upwards if households that voted in favour of SAI have unobserved characteristics that 
are positively correlated with their decision to vote for SAI as well as the outcome variable. 
For example, households who voted for SAI may treat their flat more as an investment rather 
than consumption good, therefore choosing to vote for SAI and also driving a harder bargain 
at the point of sale.  
To reduce the influence of self-selection on the estimated policy effects, we will also 
estimate Eq. (1) based on 2 restricted samples: the first admits only blocks that have SAI voting 
percentages between 65% and 85% (10 percentage points above and below the 75% threshold), 
the second includes blocks that have SAI voting percentages between 70% and 80% (5 
percentage points above and below the 75% threshold). If there is indeed a self-selection 
problem, we would expect 𝛽  and 𝛽  to fall as we restrict the sample to narrower 
margins around the threshold. This is also what we have documented in our results. 
Since the main aim of our paper is to perform a model-free estimation of the hedonic 
price function of housing space, we also interact 𝐼 ,  with dummies that represent 
different categories of a flat’s original floor area (before the implementation of SAI). 
Heterogenous estimates from these specifications are also compared with those from 
specifications that examine heterogeneity of effects by parametric functions of area and flat-
types. 
 
6. Main Results 
In this section, we first present results for resale price, then resale price per square meter. 
Table 2 captures the average effect of the space-adding item (SAI) on resale price, based on 
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the estimation of Eq. (1). Columns (1) to (3) show the results from gradually adding flat-type 
fixed effects, floor level range fixed effects, lease commencement year fixed effects and 
precinct fixed effects to the full sample regression. Column (4) further controls for block fixed 
effects. Columns (5) and (6) show the results with restricted samples (blocks that have SAI 
voting percentages between 65% and 85%; and blocks that have SAI voting percentages 
between 70% and 80% respectively) to ensure more comparable treatment and control groups.  
We consider estimates reported in Column (4) to (6) as the most conservative as they 
come with the most extensive set of controls. In all three samples, the coefficient estimates on  
𝑆𝐴𝐼 × 𝐼 ,  are statistically insignificant, suggesting that there are no differences in 
the resale price trend between the treatment and the control group (relative to the benchmark 
period) in the immediate four-month period prior to the poll for SAI. The coefficient estimates 
on 𝑆𝐴𝐼 × 𝐼 ,   and 𝑆𝐴𝐼 × 𝐼 ,  are positive and fall in magnitude as we restrict 
the sample to narrower margins around the 75% voting threshold, though the fall when we 
move from 10% to 5% margins around the threshold is negligible. This is in line with our 
expectation that the self-selection of households into the SAI package can be addressed by 
restricting the sample.   
As the sample becomes more restricted around the threshold, the poll-bill difference in 
the resale price trend between the treatment and the control group falls from 3.29% to 0.30%. 
Similarly, the post-bill difference falls from 12.63% to 6.96%. While the coefficient estimates 
on 𝑆𝐴𝐼 × 𝐼 ,   become statistically insignificant once the sample is restricted, the 
coefficient estimates on 𝑆𝐴𝐼 × 𝐼 ,  remain statistically significant throughout.  This 
suggests that the price appreciation following the space addition mainly took place after the 
billing date (which occurs after construction was completed). 
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The estimates above indicate the average treatment-on-treated effect of SAI. To 
document the extent to which the price appreciation varied with the original size of the unit, 
we further interact the treatment effect with original housing space in Table 3. Columns (1) to 
(3) impose a linear functional form while Column (4) to (6) impose a quadratic functional form. 
The results are consistent across all specifications: additional space led to an increase in total 
house value, and the extent of price appreciation decreased with original housing size. Table 
4 presents results from further relaxing the earlier functional form restrictions by allowing the 
treatment effect to vary with area categories represented by dummies. We show that our 
findings from Table 3 still hold in general. For example, the space-adding program increased 
the price of units originally smaller than 55 square meters by 15.97% (a nominal price increase 
of S$27,50022). At the same time, the price appreciation was small and statistically insignificant 
for units originally larger than 75 square meters. Given the positive correlation between house 
size and flat-types, we also document heterogeneity in treatment effects by flat-types in Table 
5. We see the largest effects in 2-room flats, and the size of these effects falls as the number of 
rooms increase. In all, our model-free estimation suggests that the hedonic price function of 
housing space appears to be concave.  
Next, we discuss the estimated effect of SAI on resale price per square meter, which 
captures the change in average price per unit of housing space. Results in Tables 6, 7, and 8 
are generally consistent with an inverted U-shape curve for average price per unit of housing 
space. For example, in column (3) of Table 7, the change in average price per unit of housing 
space was 10.46% for flats with original housing space less than 55 square meters, close to 0% 
for flats with original housing space between 55 and 65 square meters and -9.00% for flats with 
original housing space more than 85 square meters. These results suggest that total house price 
appreciation can be attributed to the combined effect of a change in housing space and the 
                                                          
22 S$27,500 is based on 16% of the mean nominal price of treated flats in our benchmark period. 
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average price per unit housing space. To illustrate, for small units less than 55 square meters, 
adding 6 square meters of space contributed to a rise in per square meter price of 10.46%. 
Together with the added space, this led to an overall price appreciation of 16% documented 
earlier.   
Lastly, we compare the marginal price of housing space which we estimate using the 
quasi-experiment, to estimates we obtain from a standard hedonic regression based on all flats 
transacted before the SAI poll (see Tables 9a and 9b for estimates from the standard hedonic 
regression). We compute marginal effects from all the different specifications and present them 
in Table 10. Based on regressions with log resale price as the dependent variable, the “average” 
marginal effect estimated using the quasi-experiment is slightly smaller than that from the 
standard hedonic regression (see Panel A: 1.25% versus 1.16%), and the estimates from the 
quasi-experiment show a larger variation in magnitudes across the different categories of 
housing space (see Figure 4 for a visual representation). In addition, the shape of the curve 
obtained if we plot average price per square meter against housing space seems to differ across 
the traditional hedonic and quasi-experiment methods (compare Column (4) in Table 9b and 
Column (3) in Table 7).  This could possibly be driven by the existence of omitted variables 
or misspecification of the functional form. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Estimating the value of any housing attribute with a standard hedonic regression often 
suffers from the problems of functional form misspecifications and omitted variable bias. To 
address these problems, we perform a model-free estimation of the hedonic price of housing 
space, by exploiting a unique quasi-experiment in Singapore that added a uniform amount of 
space (6m2) to existing housing units, regardless of their original size. This space-adding 
project was part of a large scale urban renewal and housing upgrading policy in Singapore, and 
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was carried out only if sufficient residents within a high-rise building vote in favour of it (i.e. 
at least 75% of households must vote in favour of it). We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
strategy on a restricted sample around the voting cut-off, to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity between the treatment and control groups that could invalidate the DiD 
identifying assumption.       
We find that the additional space increased the resale price of a housing unit by 7% on 
average, and the heterogeneity of price appreciation across the range of original housing size 
is consistent with a concave hedonic price function for space. We also find that the total house 
price appreciation can be attributed to a combined effect of a change in housing space together 
with a different level of average price for per unit housing space. Comparison of the estimates 
of marginal price of housing space obtained from the quasi-experiment and standard hedonic 
regression show that the “average” marginal effect estimated using the quasi-experiment is 
slightly smaller than that from the standard hedonic regression, and the estimates from the 
quasi-experiment show a larger variation in magnitudes across the different categories of 
housing space. In addition, the shape of the curve obtained if we plot average price per square 
meter against housing space seems to differ across the traditional hedonic and quasi-experiment 
methods. 
In all, this paper contributes to the scarce literature that looks specifically at the role of 
housing space in determining the value of a housing unit. It also contributes to the literature 
that combines quasi-experiments with the hedonic model to address the concern of omitted 
variables, and efforts to relax functional form restrictions on the hedonic price function. The 
unique setting allows for comparing the differencing-produced implicit prices to those obtained 
from hedonic regressions. The evidence adds to our understanding of the effectiveness of these 
two different approaches in calculating the housing price index. Lastly, it is related to the 
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literature on housing upgrading and remodelling, by providing evidence on the potential 
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Table 1a Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Summary Level 
Nominal Resale Price (S$)1 18,817 267,628 129,045 55,000 985,000 Transaction 
Nominal Resale Price Per Square Meter (S$) 18,817 3,411 1,261 1,053 8,308 Transaction 
Floor Area (Square Meters) 2 18817 76.38  20.51  40.00  171.00  Transaction 
        2-room 137  42.95  2.89  40.00  57.00  Transaction 
        3-room 12,404  64.54  6.58  52.00  83.00  Transaction 
        4-room 3,684  87.07  5.88  77.00  132.00  Transaction 
        5-room and Bigger 2,592  119.59  6.09  111.00  171.00  Transaction 
        Less than 55 square meters 620 51.27 4.66 40.00 54.00 Transaction 
        55 square meters to 65 square meters 5,358 59.33 0.98 57.00 63.00 Transaction 
        65 square meters to 75 square meters 5,695 67.69 1.01 65.00 72.00 Transaction 
        75 square meters to 85 square meters 2,731 81.83 1.22 77.00 84.00 Transaction 
        More than 85 square meters 4,413 108.42 14.25 89.00 171.00 Transaction 
Flat Type (# of Rooms) 3 18,817 3.47 0.74 2 6 Transaction 
Lease Commencement Year  18,817 1976.94 3.26 1967 1985 Transaction 
% Voted for SAI / Block 243 69.67 15.42 29.47 94.62 Block 
1 Resale price refers to price of flats sold on the open market, rather than direct sales from the Government. 
2 Floor area is based on quantity before implementation of SAI. 
3 Flat type takes on values 2 – 6, with 2-5 referring to a 2-5-room flat and 6 referring to an executive flat (a flat larger than a 5-room flat, but usually situated within the same block with 




Table 1b Summary Statistics (by HDB Town) 
Town 
No. of  
Transactions 
No. of Blocks 
Polled for SAI 
Mean Nominal 





% of Blocks 
Voting YES  
Ang Mo Kio 2,236 26 250,968 3.35 1979.0 0.73 
Bedok 3,681 48 269,614 3.58 1978.4 0.21 
Bukit Merah 1,734 24 279,546 3.41 1976.2 0.42 
Central Area 90 2 290,438 3.07 1982.1 0.50 
Choa Chu Kang 489 8 221,975 3.87 1978.6 0.25 
Clementi 1,401 16 262,484 3.30 1979.3 0.00 
Geylang 971 12 232,486 3.25 1978.1 0.67 
Jurong West 184 9 282,135 5.00 1976.0 0.11 
Kallang/Whampoa 1,528 22 260,680 3.45 1973.9 0.55 
Marine Parade 1,614 25 355,201 3.73 1975.0 0.64 
Queenstown 2,446 26 289,128 3.37 1973.9 0.65 
Toa Payoh 1,621 19 238,557 3.40 1975.7 0.74 
Woodlands 822 6 184,920 3.30 1980.8 0.00 
Total 18,817 243 267,628 3.47 1976.9 0.45 
1 Flat type takes on values 2 – 6, with 2-5 referring to a 2-5-room flat and 6 referring to an Executive flat (a flat larger than a 5-room flat, but usually situated within the 





Table 2: Impact of Space-Adding-Item (SAI) on HDB Resale Prices 
Dependent Variable: Log Resale Price 
 
 Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 65%-85% 70%-80% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SAI 0.0059 -0.0380 -0.0411** - - - 
 (0.042) (0.023) (0.017) - - - 
SAI × Placebo-Lead Period  -0.0459** -0.0267* -0.0142 -0.0114 -0.0033 0.0113 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) 
SAI × Post-Polling but Pre-Billing Period  0.0018 0.0147 0.0251* 0.0329** 0.0141 0.0030 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period  0.0744** 0.0930*** 0.1160*** 0.1263*** 0.0762*** 0.0696*** 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Month × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Flat Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Floor Level Range Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Lease Commence Year Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO NO NO 
Precinct Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Block Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Observations 18,817 18,817 18,817 18,817 10,055 5,144 
R-squared 0.865 0.893 0.943 0.949 0.947 0.951 
1 Standard errors clustered at the precinct level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 
2 The placebo-lead period is an interval of four months before the polling month – this is used in our empirical specification to provide further evidence that our DID design is valid. The 
poll-bill period stretches from the polling month to the month before households were billed for SAI. The post-bill period is from the billing month to Aug 2015. The omitted category is the 






Table 3: Impact of Space-Adding-Item on HDB Resale Prices (Heterogeneous Effects by Parametric Functions of Floor Area)  
Dependent Variable: Log Resale Price 
 
 Full Sample 65%-85% 70%-80% Full Sample 65%-85% 70%-80% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SAI × Placebo-Lead Period  -0.0101 -0.0020 0.0117 -0.0086 -0.0002 0.0123 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) 
SAI × Post-Polling but Pre-Billing Period  0.0345** 0.0154 0.0030 0.0370*** 0.0182 0.0045 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period  0.2289*** 0.2270*** 0.2469*** 0.5325*** 0.5518*** 0.4070*** 
 (0.043) (0.048) (0.062) (0.141) (0.133) (0.128) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × Area -0.0015*** -0.0022*** -0.0025*** -0.0091*** -0.0102*** -0.0065** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × Area Squared - - - 4.41e-05** 4.65e-05*** 2.29e-05 
 - - - (1.78e-05) (1.6e-05) (1.53e-05) 
Month × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Flat Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Floor Level Range Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 18,817 10,055 5,144 18,817 10,055 5,144 
R-squared 0.949 0.948 0.952 0.950 0.948 0.952 
1 Standard errors clustered at the precinct level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 






Table 4: Impact of Space-Adding-Item on HDB Resale Prices (Heterogeneous Effects by Floor Area Categories)  
Dependent Variable: Log Resale Price 
 
 Full Sample 65%-85% 70%-80% 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SAI × Placebo-Lead Period  -0.0098 -0.0012 0.0108 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) 
SAI × Post-Polling but Pre-Billing Period  0.0345** 0.0162 0.0025 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × (Area < 55 SQM) 0.2490*** 0.2270*** 0.1597*** 
 (0.029) (0.040) (0.026) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × (55 SQM ≤ Area <65 SQM) 0.1271*** 0.0855*** 0.0871*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × (65 SQM ≤ Area < 75 SQM) 0.1513*** 0.1036*** 0.0956*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × (75 SQM ≤ Area < 85 SQM) 0.0802*** 0.0317 0.0352 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.039) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × (85 SQM ≤ Area) 0.0590** -0.0083 -0.0339 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.033) 
Month × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Flat Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Floor Level Range Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Block Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 18,817 10,055 5,144 
R-squared 0.950 0.949 0.952 
1 Standard errors clustered at the precinct level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 




Table 5: Impact of Space-Adding-Item on HDB Resale Prices (Heterogeneous Effects by Flat Type)  
Dependent Variable: Log Resale Price 
 
 Full Sample 65%-85% 70%-80% 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SAI × Placebo-Lead Period  -0.0109 -0.0028 0.0090 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) 
SAI × Post-Polling but Pre-Billing Period  0.0341** 0.0142 -0.0032 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × 2-Room-Flat 0.4393*** 0.4597*** 0.3054*** 
 (0.051) (0.040) (0.030) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × 3-Room-Flat 0.1426*** 0.1020*** 0.0979*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × 4-Room-Flat 0.0405* -0.0122 -0.0256 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × 5-Room-Flat or bigger 0.0517 -0.0236 -0.0813 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.052) 
Month × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Flat Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Floor Level Range Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Block Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 18,817 10,055 5,144 
R-squared 0.951 0.950 0.954 








Table 6: Impact of Space-Adding-Item on HDB Resale Prices (Heterogeneous Effects by Parametric Functions of Floor Area)  
Dependent Variable: Log Resale Price Per Square Meter 
 
 Full Sample 65%-85% 70%-80% Full Sample 65%-85% 70%-80% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SAI × Placebo-Lead Period  -0.0128 -0.0069 0.0040 -0.0109 -0.0046 0.0052 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
SAI × Post-Polling but Pre-Billing Period  0.0381*** 0.0193 0.0072 0.0413*** 0.0231 0.0103 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period  0.2180*** 0.1827*** 0.1741*** 0.6040*** 0.6117*** 0.5060*** 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.050) (0.104) (0.097) (0.087) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × Area -0.0026*** -0.0027*** -0.0026*** -0.0122*** -0.0133*** -0.0108*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × Area Squared - - - 5.61e-05*** 6.14e-05*** 4.75e-05*** 
 - - - (1.19e-05) (1.15e-05) (1.11e-05) 
Month × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Flat Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Floor Level Range Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 18,817 10,055 5,144 18,817 10,055 5,144 
R-squared 0.936 0.941 0.948 0.937 0.942 0.949 
1 Standard errors clustered at the precinct level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 





Table 7: Impact of Space-Adding-Item on HDB Resale Prices (Heterogeneous Effects by Floor Area Categories)  
Dependent Variable: Log Resale Price Per Square Meter  
 
 Full Sample 65%-85% 70%-80% 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SAI × Placebo-Lead Period  -0.0107 -0.0052 0.0032 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
SAI × Post-Polling but Pre-Billing Period  0.0411*** 0.0216 0.0073 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × (Area < 55 SQM) 0.2004*** 0.1603*** 0.1046*** 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.025) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × (55 SQM ≤ Area <65 SQM) 0.0619** 0.0216 0.0166 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × (65 SQM ≤ Area < 75 SQM) 0.0412** 0.0115 0.0102 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × (75 SQM ≤ Area < 85 SQM) -0.0231 -0.0695*** -0.0778*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × (85 SQM ≤ Area) -0.0299 -0.0808*** -0.0900*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) 
Month × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Flat Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Floor Level Range Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Block Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 18,817 10,055 5,144 
R-squared 0.937 0.942 0.949 
1 Standard errors clustered at the precinct level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 




Table 8: Impact of Space-Adding-Item on HDB Resale Prices (Heterogeneous Effects by Flat Type)  
Dependent Variable: Log Resale Price Per Square Meter  
 
 Full Sample 65%-85% 70%-80% 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SAI × Placebo-Lead Period  -0.0146 -0.0080 0.0019 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
SAI × Post-Polling but Pre-Billing Period  0.0362*** 0.0181 0.0027 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × 2-Room-Flat 0.3073*** 0.3228*** 0.1701*** 
 (0.046) (0.040) (0.029) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × 3-Room-Flat 0.0544** 0.0163 0.0101 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × 4-Room-Flat -0.0295 -0.0813*** -0.0889*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
SAI × Post-Billing Period × 5-Room-Flat or bigger -0.0361 -0.0702** -0.1141** 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.052) 
Month × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Flat Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Floor Level Range Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Block Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 18,817 10,055 5,144 
R-squared 0.937 0.942 0.949 






Table 9a: Hedonic Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable Log Resale Price Log Resale Price Per Square Meter 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Original Floor Area 0.0125*** 0.0268*** 0.0698*** -0.0008 0.0041 0.0358 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.025) (0.001) (0.004) (0.025) 
Original Floor Area Squared - -0.0001*** -0.0006** - -3.15e-05 -0.0004 
 - (0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) (0.000) 
Original Floor Area Cube - - 1.61e-06* - - 1.19e-06 
 - - (0.000) - - (0.000) 
Month × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Flat Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Floor Level Range Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,992 5,992 5,992 5,992 5,992 5,992 
R-squared 0.944 0.946 0.946 0.843 0.843 0.844 
1 Standard errors clustered at the precinct level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. Sample is based on periods 
prior to the polling of SAI. 






Table 9b: Hedonic Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable Log Resale Price Log Resale Price Per Square Meter 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Area < 55 SQM -0.7658*** - -0.0320 - 
 (0.051) - (0.040) - 
55 SQM ≤ Area <65 SQM -0.5673*** - -0.0438 - 
 (0.025) - (0.029) - 
65 SQM ≤ Area < 75 SQM -0.4135*** - -0.0547*** - 
 (0.018) - (0.019) - 
75 SQM ≤ Area < 85 SQM 2 -0.1711*** - -0.0045 - 
 (0.017) - (0.022) - 
2-Room-Flat - -1.0759*** - -0.0917* 
 - (0.041) - (0.054) 
3-Room-Flat - -0.6592*** - 0.0150 
 - (0.032) - (0.049) 
4-Room-Flat 2 - -0.2878*** - 0.0965* 
 - (0.037) - (0.055) 
Month × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Flat Type Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO 
Floor Level Range Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Block Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,992 5,992 5,992 5,992 
R-squared 0.939 0.882 0.838 0.738 
1 Standard errors clustered at the precinct level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. Sample is based on periods 
prior to the polling of SAI. 
2 Floor area is based on quantity before implementation of SAI. 
3 Suppressed category for regression specifications estimated in Col (1) and (3) is 85 SQM ≤ Area. Suppressed category for regression specifications estimated in Col (2) and (4) is 5-room-





Table 10: Summary of the Marginal Effect of Housing Space 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Space Categories Area < 55 SQM 
55 SQM ≤ Area 
<65 SQM 
65 SQM ≤ Area < 
75 SQM 
75 SQM ≤ Area < 
85 SQM 85 SQM ≤ Area 
Average Space within Each Category 51.27 59.33 67.69 81.83 108.42 
Panel A: Log Resale Price      
Hedonic Estimates      
    Linear Function of Space 1 1.25% 1.25% 1.25% 1.25% 1.25% 
    Quadratic Function of Space 1 1.65% 1.49% 1.33% 1.04% 0.51% 
    Cubic Function of Space 1 2.10% 1.56% 1.07% 0.39% -0.35% 
    Dummies of Space Categories 2 2.46% 1.84% 1.71% 0.64% - 
Identified around the Voting Cut-off in DID      
    Constant 3 1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 
    Linear Function of Space 4 1.98% 1.64% 1.29% 0.71% -0.40% 
    Quadratic Function of Space 4 2.23% 1.70% 1.20% 0.47% -0.48% 
    Dummies of Space Categories 5 2.66% 1.45% 1.59% 0.59% -0.57% 
Panel B: Log Resale Price Per Square Meter      
Identified around the Voting Cut-off in DID      
    Linear Function of Space 6 0.68% 0.33% -0.03% -0.64% -1.80% 
    Quadratic Function of Space 6 1.29% 0.54% -0.12% -0.99% -1.78% 
    Dummies of Space Categories 7 1.74% 0.28% 0.17% -1.30% -1.50% 
1 Based on estimates in Table 9a. 
2 Based on estimates in Table 9b. 
3 Based on estimates in Table 2. 
4 Based on estimates in Table 3. 
5 Based on estimates in Table 4. 
6 Based on estimates in Table 6. 







Source: Data on upgrading are from HDB’s online enquiry service; data on age of flats are from 
http://www.teoalida.com/singapore/hdbdatabase/ 
 
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Upgraded Blocks and Mean Age of Flats (as of 2015) within each Planning Area 




































































































Figure 3c: Monthly mean of residuals from regressing log resale price on block fixed effects  
(Blocks with polling results 65%-85%24) 
 
                                                          
24 We don’t plot the price trend using more restricted sample in the 70% - 80% range because its small sample size prevents us 
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Source: HDB Website, http://services2.hdb.gov.sg/webapp/BB33RESLSTATUS/images/Singapore_Map.jpg  
Figure A1: Location of HDB New Towns 
 
 
